Binding Promises and Cooperation Among Strangers

10 Pages Posted: 23 Dec 2014

See all articles by Gabriele Camera

Gabriele Camera

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute; University of Bologna - Dept. of Economics

Marco Casari

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Maria Bigoni

University of Bologna - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: November 27, 2012

Abstract

In an experiment, a group of strangers was randomly divided in pairs to play a prisoners’ dilemma; this process was indefinitely repeated. Cooperation did not increase when subjects could send public messages amounting to binding promises of future play.

Keywords: coordination, cheap-talk, deception, repeated game, social norms

JEL Classification: C90, C70, D80

Suggested Citation

Camera, Gabriele and Casari, Marco and Bigoni, Maria, Binding Promises and Cooperation Among Strangers (November 27, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2541948 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2541948

Gabriele Camera (Contact Author)

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute ( email )

Orange, CA 92866
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www1.chapman.edu/~camera/

University of Bologna - Dept. of Economics ( email )

Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy

Marco Casari

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy

Maria Bigoni

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 2
Bologna, Bologna 40126
Italy
+390512098134 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.unibo.it/sitoweb/maria.bigoni/en

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
13
Abstract Views
261
PlumX Metrics
!

Under construction: SSRN citations while be offline until July when we will launch a brand new and improved citations service, check here for more details.

For more information