Cooperative Strategies in Anonymous Economies: An Experiment

46 Pages Posted: 23 Dec 2014

See all articles by Gabriele Camera

Gabriele Camera

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute; University of Bologna - Dept. of Economics

Marco Casari

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Maria Bigoni

University of Bologna - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: February 10, 2012

Abstract

We study cooperation in economies of indefinite duration. Participants faced a sequence of prisoner’s dilemmas with anonymous opponents. We identify and characterize the strategies employed at the individual level. We report that (i) grim trigger does not describe well individual play and there is wide heterogeneity in strategies; (ii) systematic defection does not crowd-out systematic cooperation; (iii) coordination on cooperative strategies does not improve with experience. We discuss alternative methodologies and implications for theory.

Keywords: Folk theorem, repeated games, equilibrium selection, finite automata, social dilemma, random matching

JEL Classification: C90, C70, D80

Suggested Citation

Camera, Gabriele and Casari, Marco and Bigoni, Maria, Cooperative Strategies in Anonymous Economies: An Experiment (February 10, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2541961 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2541961

Gabriele Camera (Contact Author)

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute ( email )

Orange, CA 92866
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www1.chapman.edu/~camera/

University of Bologna - Dept. of Economics ( email )

Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy

Marco Casari

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy

Maria Bigoni

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 2
Bologna, Bologna 40126
Italy
+390512098134 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.unibo.it/sitoweb/maria.bigoni/en

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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