Proportional Representation with Uncertainty

17 Pages Posted: 24 Dec 2014

See all articles by Francesco De Sinopoli

Francesco De Sinopoli

University of Verona - Department of Economics

Giovanna Iannantuoni

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics; Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS); Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS)

Elena Manzoni

University of Verona - Department of Economics

Carlos Pimienta

University of New South Wales (UNSW)

Date Written: December 23, 2014

Abstract

We introduce a model with strategic voting in a parliamentary election with proportional representation and uncertainty about voters’ preferences. In any equilibrium of the model, most voters only vote for those parties whose positions are extreme. In the resulting parliament, a consensus government forms and the policy maximizing the sum of utilities of the members of the government is implemented.

Keywords: Proportional Election, Strategic Voting, Legislative Bargaining

JEL Classification: C72, D72

Suggested Citation

De Sinopoli, Francesco and Iannantuoni, Giovanna and Manzoni, Elena and Pimienta, Carlos, Proportional Representation with Uncertainty (December 23, 2014). University of Milan Bicocca Department of Economics, Management and Statistics Working Paper No. 288. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2542205 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2542205

Francesco De Sinopoli

University of Verona - Department of Economics ( email )

Via dell'Artigliere, 8
37129 Verona
Italy

Giovanna Iannantuoni (Contact Author)

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics ( email )

Calle Madrid 126
Getafe, 28903
Spain

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milano, 20126
Italy

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milan, 20126
Italy

Elena Manzoni

University of Verona - Department of Economics ( email )

Via dell'Artigliere, 8
37129 Verona
Italy

Carlos Pimienta

University of New South Wales (UNSW) ( email )

Kensington
High St
Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia

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