Download This PaperProportional Representation with Uncertainty
University of Milan Bicocca Department of Economics, Management and Statistics Working Paper No. 288
17 Pages Posted: 24 Dec 2014
Date Written: December 23, 2014
Abstract
We introduce a model with strategic voting in a parliamentary election with proportional representation and uncertainty about voters’ preferences. In any equilibrium of the model, most voters only vote for those parties whose positions are extreme. In the resulting parliament, a consensus government forms and the policy maximizing the sum of utilities of the members of the government is implemented.
Keywords: Proportional Election, Strategic Voting, Legislative Bargaining
JEL Classification: C72, D72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS) ( email )
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Milano, 20126
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Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS) ( email )
Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milan, 20126
Italy