Heidegger, and Wittgenstein: From Anti-Skepticism to 'Being-In'

Posted: 26 Dec 2014 Last revised: 2 May 2016

See all articles by Arash Khorashadi

Arash Khorashadi

Central European University; Central European University (CEU) - Department of Philosophy

Date Written: December 24, 2014


In this paper, it is showed that affinities between Wittgenstein and Heidegger are not restricted merely to epistemological and/or methodological ones; but there are also ontological similarities between them. Not only non-Cartesian, their ontological common grounds are also against the skepticism which goes hand in hand with Cartesianism. They both do regard the skeptical problems of “external world” and “other minds” as pseudo problems that must be dissolved instead of being solved. So construed, Cartesianism is as meaningless as its offspring, skepticism, for both of them. This criticism against an old tradition can be generally seen throughout Philosophical Investigations and Being and Time. On the one hand, Wittgenstein attacks to tradition by his rejection of the “private language of sensation” as well as his defence of the ontological grounds of the linguistic community ( whether or not any actual community member exist.) On the other hand, Heidegger destructs the Cartesian framework based on the impossibility of “Intentionality” and “transcendence” in a Cartesian world.

Keywords: Cartesianism, External world, Other minds, Skepticism, the private language of sensation, Transcendence, Intentionality.

Suggested Citation

Khorashadi, Arash, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein: From Anti-Skepticism to 'Being-In' (December 24, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2542514 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2542514

Arash Khorashadi (Contact Author)

Central European University ( email )

Nador utca 9
Budapest, H-1051

Central European University (CEU) - Department of Philosophy ( email )

H 1051
Nador u. 9

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