The Impact of Stronger Shareholder Control on Bondholders
60 Pages Posted: 30 Dec 2014 Last revised: 9 Oct 2018
Date Written: September 26, 2018
Abstract
We study the impact of stronger shareholder control on bondholders. We find that the passage of a shareholder-sponsored governance proposal leads to a decline in CDS spreads, indicating a net positive effect on bondholders. Increasing shareholder control mitigates managerial entrenchment, which provides gains to bondholders that are larger than the negative impact that increased shareholder control has on shareholder-bondholder conflicts. Results are stronger for firms with existing high levels of shareholder-bondholder conflict, and for proposals that mitigate managerial entrenchment without exacerbating risk-shifting concerns. Stronger shareholder control leads to an improvement in credit ratings and operating performance in the long-term.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Debt, Agency Cost, Shareholder Meetings, Regression Discontinuity, Event Studies
JEL Classification: G34, G32, G14
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
