Noisy Signaling through Open Market Share Repurchase Programs and Information Production by Institutions
62 Pages Posted: 29 Dec 2014 Last revised: 11 Apr 2022
Date Written: January 15, 2016
We propose a “noisy signaling” hypothesis of open market share repurchase (OMSR) programs, where the equity market equilibrium that prevails after OMSR announcements is a partial pooling rather than a fully separating equilibrium (as in existing literature). We argue that two complementary mechanisms, namely, actual share repurchases by firms and information production by institutions, serve to reduce the residual equity market information asymmetry facing firms subsequent to OMSR announcements. We test the implications of our noisy signaling hypothesis using transaction-level data on trading by institutions and by a subsample of identified hedge funds, finding strong support for the above hypothesis.
Keywords: Open-Market Repurchases, Institutional Trading, Information Production
JEL Classification: G23, G35
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation