Compensation and Competition for Talent: Evidence from the Financial Industry

Posted: 6 Jan 2015

See all articles by Mariassunta Giannetti

Mariassunta Giannetti

Stockholm School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Swedish House of Finance

Daniel Metzger

Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance; London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Financial Markets Group; Swedish House of Finance

Date Written: January 5, 2015

Abstract

We show that long-term compensation is associated with higher pay in the financial industry and this association is stronger in markets with high competition for talent. We argue that this evidence supports models of competition for talent based on retention motives.

Keywords: Competition for talent; Retention; Optimal contracts; Finance labor market

JEL Classification: G34, J31, J33, J41, J44, M52

Suggested Citation

Giannetti, Mariassunta and Metzger, Daniel, Compensation and Competition for Talent: Evidence from the Financial Industry (January 5, 2015). Finance Research Letters, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2545313

Mariassunta Giannetti (Contact Author)

Stockholm School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 6501
Sveavagen 65
SE-113 83 Stockholm
Sweden
+46 8 736 9607 (Phone)
+46 8 312 327 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/mariassuntagiannetti/Home

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Swedish House of Finance ( email )

Drottninggatan 98
111 60 Stockholm
Sweden

Daniel Metzger

Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance ( email )

SE-113 83 Stockholm
Sweden

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Financial Markets Group ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Swedish House of Finance ( email )

Drottninggatan 98
111 60 Stockholm
Sweden

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