River Sharing and Water Trade

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 15-001/VIII

22 Pages Posted: 7 Jan 2015

See all articles by Erik Ansink

Erik Ansink

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Spatial Economics

Michael Gengenbach

Wageningen UR

Hans-Peter Weikard

Wageningen UR - School of Social Sciences

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Date Written: January 6, 2015

Abstract

We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite for trade. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not emerge if there are four or more agents along the river. Instead, a partial market may emerge where a subset of agents trades river water while other agents can take some of the river water that passes their territory.

Keywords: river sharing, water trade, market emergence, property rights, coalition stability

JEL Classification: D62, C72, Q25

Suggested Citation

Ansink, Erik and Gengenbach, Michael and Weikard, Hans-Peter, River Sharing and Water Trade (January 6, 2015). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 15-001/VIII. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2545898 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2545898

Erik Ansink (Contact Author)

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Spatial Economics ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
1081HV Amsterdam
Netherlands

Michael Gengenbach

Wageningen UR ( email )

Hollandseweg 1
6706KN
Netherlands

Hans-Peter Weikard

Wageningen UR - School of Social Sciences ( email )

De Leeuwenborch
Hollandseweg 1
6706 KN Wageningen
Netherlands
+31 317 48 24 94 (Phone)
+31 317 48 49 33 (Fax)

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