Download This PaperMarket (In)Attention and the Strategic Scheduling and Timing of Earnings Announcements
Journal of Accounting and Economics, Volume 60, Issue 1, August 2015, Pages 36–55
Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 201
Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 15-8
48 Pages Posted: 7 Jan 2015 Last revised: 18 Sep 2015
Date Written: March 3, 2015
Abstract
We investigate whether managers “hide” bad news by announcing earnings during periods of low attention, or by providing less forewarning of an upcoming earnings announcement. Our findings are consistent with managers reporting bad news after market hours, on busy days, and with less advance notice, and with earnings receiving less attention in these settings. Paradoxically, our findings indicate that managers also report bad news on Fridays, but we do not find lower attention on Fridays. Further, we find negative returns when the market is notified of an upcoming Friday earnings announcement, which is consistent with investors inferring forthcoming bad news.
Keywords: Market attention, earnings announcement timing, earnings announcement scheduling, earnings announcement notifications, strategic disclosure
JEL Classification: L20, M10, M41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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