Network Formation and Systemic Risk

33 Pages Posted: 8 Jan 2015 Last revised: 3 Oct 2017

Selman Erol

Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business

Rakesh Vohra

University of Pennsylvania - The Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science and Economics (PCPSE)

Date Written: May 30, 2017

Abstract

This paper introduces a model of endogenous network formation and systemic risk. In the model a link represents a trading opportunity that yields benefits only if the counterparty does not subsequently default. After links are formed, they are subjected to exogenous shocks that are either good or bad. Bad shocks reduce returns from links and incentivize default. Good shocks, the reverse. Defaults triggered by bad shocks might propagate via links. The model yields three insights. The first concerns the volatility paradox. A higher probability of good shocks generates a higher systemic risk because increased inter-connectedness in the network o sets the effect of better fundamentals. Second, the networks formed in the model are utilitarian efficient. The former is a consequence of contagion being triggered too often, whereas the latter is a consequence of contagion spreading easily. Third, the network formed critically depends on the correlation between shocks to the links. As a consequence, an outside observer who misconceives the correlation structure of shocks, upon observing a highly interconnected network, will significantly underestimate the probability of system wide default.

Keywords: Network Formation, Systemic Risk, Volatility Paradox, Contagion, Rationalizability, Group Stability

JEL Classification: D85, G01

Suggested Citation

Erol, Selman and Vohra, Rakesh, Network Formation and Systemic Risk (May 30, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2546310 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2546310

Selman Erol (Contact Author)

Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business ( email )

5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States

Rakesh Vohra

University of Pennsylvania - The Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science and Economics (PCPSE) ( email )

133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States

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