Consumers' Access to EU Competition Law Procedures: Outer and Inner Limits

29 Pages Posted: 8 Jan 2015

See all articles by Kati Cseres

Kati Cseres

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance and Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics

Joana Mendes

Universite du Luxembourg

Date Written: December 9, 2013

Abstract

Enforcement of competition law affects consumers’ economic interests, as part of the public interests EU competition law protects. Therefore, consumers ought to be involved in the respective enforcement procedures. Against this normative background, we analyse consumers’ access to the public enforcement by the Commission; we assess whether and how the formal role they are assigned during this procedure and the way access is defined enable consumers to protect their economic interests. We identify outer and inner limits to consumers’ access to competition enforcement procedures, arising from the Commission's discretion in handling complaints and in defining access to information. We critically evaluate those limits against the contention that the enforcement of competition law rules, and the way it is pursued by administrative actors, ought to be guided by the public interests inherent in EU competition law.

Keywords: EU competition law, consumer protection, procedural rights, public and private enforcement, access to information, participation rights

Suggested Citation

Cseres, Kati and Mendes, Joana, Consumers' Access to EU Competition Law Procedures: Outer and Inner Limits (December 9, 2013). Common Market Law Review, Vol. 51, No. 2, 2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2546694

Kati Cseres

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance and Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics ( email )

Oudemanshuispoort 4-6
Amsterdam, 1012 CN
Netherlands

Joana Mendes (Contact Author)

Universite du Luxembourg ( email )

L-1511 Luxembourg
Luxembourg

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