Wanted: A Bigger Stick. On Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts with Online Service Providers

Journal of Consumer Policy 2016/1, p. 63-90

28 Pages Posted: 10 Jan 2015 Last revised: 2 Mar 2016

See all articles by Marco Loos

Marco Loos

University of Amsterdam - Centre for the Study of European Contract Law (CSECL)

Joasia Luzak

University of Exeter - School of Law; University of Amsterdam - Centre for the Study of European Contract Law (CSECL)

Date Written: January 8, 2015

Abstract

The Unfair Contract Terms Directive offers consumers protection from pre-arranged imbalanced contract terms. While the standard terms and conditions and privacy policies used by online service providers have previously been accused of harming clients of such online services, a comprehensive analysis of the potential unfair character of such terms and conditions has not yet been proposed. This paper aims to fill in this gap in the academic literature. It identifies several types of contractual terms that international online service providers provide to consumers, which are unlikely to pass the Directive's unfairness test.

Keywords: Consumer contracts; unfair contract terms; online service providers; compliance; private international law

JEL Classification: K12

Suggested Citation

Loos, Marco and Luzak, Joanna Aleksandra, Wanted: A Bigger Stick. On Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts with Online Service Providers (January 8, 2015). Journal of Consumer Policy 2016/1, p. 63-90. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2546859 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2546859

Marco Loos (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam - Centre for the Study of European Contract Law (CSECL) ( email )

P.O. Box 1030
Amsterdam, 1000 BA
Netherlands

Joanna Aleksandra Luzak

University of Exeter - School of Law ( email )

Streatham Court
University of Exeter
Exeter, EX4 4QJ
United Kingdom

University of Amsterdam - Centre for the Study of European Contract Law (CSECL) ( email )

P.O. Box 1030
Amsterdam, 1000 BA
Netherlands

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