Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication

101 Pages Posted: 10 Jan 2015 Last revised: 31 Jul 2015

See all articles by Bijal Shah

Bijal Shah

Arizona State University (ASU) - Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law

Abstract

This article is the first to fully explore the widespread occurrence of administrative adjudication that traverses agency boundaries, which it deems “coordinated interagency adjudication.” It identifies ways in which poor interagency coordination has harmed immigration adjudication, and hypothesizes that problems in coordinated interagency adjudication exist across the executive branch. To substantiate its claim, it relies on analyses of primary source materials, including interagency agreements and policies, drawn from impactful areas of public law such as immigration, employment discrimination, health and safety, and domestic security. Finally, this article suggests that ex ante executive oversight of these types of processes could prevent failures in administrative adjudication resulting from poor interagency coordination, and mitigate some broader concerns about agencies overstepping their jurisdictional authority.

Keywords: Administrative law, Executive oversight, Agencies, Coordination, Adjudication, Presidential power, White House

Suggested Citation

Shah, Bijal, Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication. Harvard Law Review, Vol. 128, No. 3, p. 805, 2015. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2546931

Bijal Shah (Contact Author)

Arizona State University (ASU) - Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law ( email )

Phoenix, AZ
United States

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