Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2547576
 


 



Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Governance, and Managerial Risk-Taking


Mohamed Ayadi


Brock University - Department of Finance, Operations and Information Systems (FOIS)

Martin I. Kusy


Brock University, Goodman School of Business

Minyoung Pyo


Brock University

Samir Trabelsi


Brock University - Accounting

January 9, 2015

2015 Canadian Academic Accounting Association (CAAA) Annual Conference

Abstract:     
This paper investigates the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and managerial risk-taking, as well as the differences in governance structure that affect this association. Using a sample of US public firms, we find that firms with strong CSR records engage in higher risk-taking. Furthermore, we find that accounting for differences in governance structure substantially accentuates this relationship. Prior literature establishes that high managerial risk-tolerance is necessary for the undertaking of risky yet profitable investment decisions. Thus, these findings suggest that CSR, rather than being a waste of scarce corporate resources, is instead an important aspect of shareholder value creation. They contribute to the debate on CSR by documenting that corporate risk-taking is one mechanism among others through which CSR maps into higher firm value.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 81

Keywords: Corporate social responsibility, corporate governance, managerial risk taking, panel regression

JEL Classification: G30, G21, C33


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Date posted: January 9, 2015  

Suggested Citation

Ayadi, Mohamed and Kusy, Martin I. and Pyo, Minyoung and Trabelsi, Samir, Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Governance, and Managerial Risk-Taking (January 9, 2015). 2015 Canadian Academic Accounting Association (CAAA) Annual Conference. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2547576 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2547576

Contact Information

Mohamed Ayadi (Contact Author)
Brock University - Department of Finance, Operations and Information Systems (FOIS) ( email )
Ontario, L2S 3A1
Canada
Martin I. Kusy
Brock University, Goodman School of Business ( email )
500 Glenridge Avenue
International Business and Strategy
St. Catherine's, Ontario L2S 3A1
Canada
Minyoung Pyo
Brock University ( email )
500 Glenridge Avenue
St. Catherines, Ontario L2S 3A1
Canada
Samir Trabelsi
Brock University - Accounting ( email )
St. Catharines, Ontario L2S 3A1
Canada
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