Agency Coordinators Outside of the Executive Branch

128 Harvard Law Review Forum 64 (2015)

11 Pages Posted: 13 Jan 2015

See all articles by Jennifer Nou

Jennifer Nou

University of Chicago - Law School

Date Written: January 12, 2015

Abstract

The administrative state’s experience with presidential oversight thus far offers some lessons that should temper the case for centralized executive branch control, especially in the context of agency adjudication. This Response to Bijal Shah’s Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication identifies some of the less recognized costs and limited benefits of coordination that may help to explain why the President often refrains from exercising such oversight in practice. In light of these dynamics, the discussion considers other candidate coordinators outside of the executive branch, such as the Judicial Conference, the Administrative Office of the Courts, and the Administrative Conference of the United States. These entities, of course, have their own institutional limitations and drawbacks, which may mitigate their effectiveness. The more general effort here is to broaden the lens of agency coordinators beyond that of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) and other executive branch entities.

Keywords: interagency coordination, agency adjudication, administrative law judges, presidential oversight, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Judicial Conference, Administrative Conference of the United States

Suggested Citation

Nou, Jennifer, Agency Coordinators Outside of the Executive Branch (January 12, 2015). 128 Harvard Law Review Forum 64 (2015), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2548563

Jennifer Nou (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Law School ( email )

1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/nou

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