Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2548641
 


 



Tax Rates and Corporate Decision Making


John R. Graham


Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Michelle Hanlon


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

Terry J. Shevlin


University of California-Irvine

Nemit Shroff


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

January 20, 2017

Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
We survey companies and find that many use incorrect tax rate inputs into important corporate decisions. Specifically, many companies use an average tax rate (the GAAP effective tax rate, ETR) to evaluate incremental decisions, rather than using the theoretically correct marginal tax rate. We find evidence consistent with behavioral biases (heuristics, salience) and managers’ educational backgrounds affecting these choices. We estimate the economic consequences of using the theoretically incorrect tax rate and find that using the ETR for capital structure decisions leads to suboptimal leverage choices and using the ETR in investment decisions makes firms less responsive to investment opportunities.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 85

Keywords: Tax rates, marginal tax rate, effective tax rate, investment, capital structure, behavioral biases, salience, heuristics


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Date posted: January 13, 2015 ; Last revised: January 21, 2017

Suggested Citation

Graham, John R. and Hanlon, Michelle and Shevlin, Terry J. and Shroff, Nemit, Tax Rates and Corporate Decision Making (January 20, 2017). Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2548641 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2548641

Contact Information

John Robert Graham
Duke University ( email )
Box 90120
Durham, NC 27708-0120
United States
919-660-7857 (Phone)
919-660-8030 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Michelle Hanlon
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
100 Main Street
E62-668
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-9849 (Phone)

Terry J. Shevlin
University of California-Irvine ( email )
Paul Merage School of Business
Irvine, CA 92697-3125
United States
949-824-6149 (Phone)
Nemit Shroff (Contact Author)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
100 Main St.
E62-679
Cambridge, MA MA 02142
United States
6173240805 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://mitsloan.mit.edu/faculty/detail.php?in_spseqno=51407&co_list=F

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