Efficient Dynamic Allocation with Strategic Arrivals

26 Pages Posted: 14 Jan 2015

See all articles by Alex Gershkov

Alex Gershkov

Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Benny Moldovanu

University of Bonn - Chair of Economic Theory II; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Philipp Strack

Yale, Department of Economics

Date Written: January 12, 2015

Abstract

We analyze dynamic allocations in a model with uncertain demand and with unobservable arrivals. The planner learns along the way about future demand, but strategic agents, who anticipate this behavior, strategically choose the timing of their arrivals. We examine the conditions under which the complete information, dynamically efficient allocation is implementable, and characterize the necessary payments that control the ensuing allocative and informational externalities.

Suggested Citation

Gershkov, Alex and Moldovanu, Benny and Strack, Philipp, Efficient Dynamic Allocation with Strategic Arrivals (January 12, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2548740 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2548740

Alex Gershkov (Contact Author)

Hebrew University of Jerusalem ( email )

Mount Scopus
Jerusalem, IL Jerusalem 91905
Israel

HOME PAGE: http://pluto.huji.ac.il/~alexg/

Benny Moldovanu

University of Bonn - Chair of Economic Theory II ( email )

Lennestrasse 37
53113 Bonn
Germany
+49 228 736395 (Phone)
+49 228 737940 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Philipp Strack

Yale, Department of Economics ( email )

28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States

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