Tenure Security and Soil Conservation in an Overlapping Generation Rural Economy

26 Pages Posted: 14 Jan 2015 Last revised: 24 Feb 2017

See all articles by Shaikh Eskander

Shaikh Eskander

London School of Economics - Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment

Edward B. Barbier

Colorado State University, Fort Collins - Department of Economics

Date Written: November 5, 2014

Abstract

Tenure security and subsistence needs influence the choice between unexploited topsoil and investment in children’s human capital as the mode of transfer of wealth. We develop an overlapping generations model of a representative rural household to inform this choice. Using a unique household-level survey dataset from Bangladesh, which contains data on soil conservation and human capital investments, we find that tenure security and poverty have statistically significant and opposite associations with conservation and human capital investments. Tenure security is associated with greater topsoil conservation investment, while the poor households have lower conservation and human capital investments. We infer that enhanced tenure security may lower the adverse consequences of poverty on soil conservation, and vice-versa. Thus, by substituting for private human capital investments such as educational expenditure, increased public expenditure on schooling may lower the pressure on land and soil resources.

Keywords: Human capital, soil conservation, subsistence, tenure security

JEL Classification: Q24, D13, D64, D91, Q15.

Suggested Citation

Eskander, Shaikh and Barbier, Edward B., Tenure Security and Soil Conservation in an Overlapping Generation Rural Economy (November 5, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2548741 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2548741

Shaikh Eskander (Contact Author)

London School of Economics - Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
Great Britain

Edward B. Barbier

Colorado State University, Fort Collins - Department of Economics ( email )

Fort Collins, CO 80523-1771
United States

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