Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry

31 Pages Posted: 16 Jan 2015

See all articles by Jay Pil Choi

Jay Pil Choi

Michigan State University - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Subhasish M. Chowdhury

University of Bath - Department of Economics

Jaesoo Kim

Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 30, 2014

Abstract

We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the same time engage in contest with fellow group members to appropriate the possible reward. We introduce within group power asymmetry and complementarity in members’ efforts, and analyze how each group’s internal conflict influences its chance of winning in the external conflict. We find that a more symmetric group may expend more effort in external conflict when the (common) collective action technology exhibits a high degree of complementarity. Furthermore, depending on the degree of complementarity, the stronger player’s relative contribution to external conflict may be higher in a more asymmetric group and, as a result, it is possible for the weaker player to earn a higher payoff. In absence of any complementarity, the rent-dissipation is non-monotonic with the within-group power asymmetry.

Keywords: conflict, collective action, group contest, asymmetry

JEL Classification: C720, D720, D740, H410

Suggested Citation

Choi, Jay Pil and Chowdhury, Subhasish M. and Kim, Jaesoo, Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry (December 30, 2014). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5137, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2550137

Jay Pil Choi

Michigan State University - Department of Economics ( email )

101 Marshall Hall
East Lansing, MI 48824
United States
517-353-7281 (Phone)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Subhasish M. Chowdhury (Contact Author)

University of Bath - Department of Economics ( email )

Claverton Down
Bath, BA2 7AY
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/subhasishmc/

Jaesoo Kim

Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) - Department of Economics ( email )

425 University Boulevard
Indianapolis, IN 46202-5140
Germany

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
53
Abstract Views
585
rank
429,175
PlumX Metrics