The Rise of the Discipline and Inspection Commission 1927-2012: Anticorruption Investigation and Decision-Making in the Chinese Communist Party

Abstract

This article traces and analyzes the longitudinal changes of the operative structure, rules and practices of the Party disciplinary institution not for the purpose of appraising its performance in corruption control but to demonstrate how the Party regulates its own enforcement agency through institutionalizing the disciplinary decision-making process. To that end, this article identifies and explains the exact measures that the Party has used to delegate authority to the Party’s disciplinary institution in a systematic and institutionalized manner without losing control over the disciplinary outcome. It also identifies three features of the institutionalization process: concentration and centralization of disciplinary power and further depoliticization of disciplinary activities.

Keywords: Chinese Law, Chinese Studies, Law and Society, Law and Politics, Political Corruption, Democracy, Contemporary China, Authoritarianism, Anti-Corruption, Corruption, Chinese Communist Party, Party System, party state

JEL Classification: K1, K2, K3, K4