The Effect of Unemployment Benefits on the Duration of Unemployment Insurance Receipt: New Evidence from a Regression Kink Design in Missouri, 2003-2013

28 Pages Posted: 20 Jan 2015 Last revised: 10 Jul 2023

See all articles by David Card

David Card

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Andrew C. Johnston

University of California, Merced - Department of Economics

Andrew Johnston

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School

Pauline Leung

Princeton University

Alexandre Mas

Princeton University - Industrial Relations Section

Zhuan Pei

W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2015

Abstract

We provide new evidence on the effect of the unemployment insurance (UI) weekly benefit amount on unemployment insurance spells based on administrative data from the state of Missouri covering the period 2003-2013. Identification comes from a regression kink design that exploits the quasi-experimental variation around the kink in the UI benefit schedule. We find that UI durations are more responsive to benefit levels during the recession and its aftermath, with an elasticity between 0.65 and 0.9 as compared to about 0.35 pre-recession.

Suggested Citation

Card, David E. and Johnston, Andrew C. and Johnston, Andrew and Leung, Pauline and Mas, Alexandre and Pei, Zhuan, The Effect of Unemployment Benefits on the Duration of Unemployment Insurance Receipt: New Evidence from a Regression Kink Design in Missouri, 2003-2013 (January 2015). NBER Working Paper No. w20869, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2551677

David E. Card (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics ( email )

Room 3880
Berkeley, CA 94720-3880
United States
510-642-5222 (Phone)
510-643-7042 (Fax)

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Andrew C. Johnston

University of California, Merced - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 2039
Merced, CA 95344
United States

Andrew Johnston

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

Pauline Leung

Princeton University ( email )

Alexandre Mas

Princeton University - Industrial Relations Section ( email )

Princeton, NJ 08544-2098
United States

Zhuan Pei

W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research ( email )

300 South Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, MI 49007-4686
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
37
Abstract Views
756
PlumX Metrics