Transparency or Deception: What the Fed Was Saying in 2007

Mises Institute Working Paper #0015/15

31 Pages Posted: 23 Jan 2015 Last revised: 27 Mar 2015

Date Written: January 15, 2015


Central banks have embarked on a transition from relative secrecy to relative transparency over the last two decades. This has led researchers to investigate the ramifications of transparency on important economic outcomes. By and large, the results reported have been favorable, favorable with qualifications, or ambiguous. This paper examines the communications of officials from the Federal Reserve during 2007, the year between the end of the housing bubble and the beginning of the financial crisis. In contrast to previous finding, these communications are indicative of either deception, incompetence, or a combination of both.

Keywords: Federal Reserve, central banking, market distortions, public policy

JEL Classification: E42, E52

Suggested Citation

Thornton, Mark, Transparency or Deception: What the Fed Was Saying in 2007 (January 15, 2015). Mises Institute Working Paper #0015/15. Available at SSRN: or

Mark Thornton (Contact Author)

Ludwig von Mises Institute ( email )

Auburn, AL
United States
334-321-2100 (Phone)


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