Anonymous Sharing Behavior in Web Experiments with Different Balance of Power

33 Pages Posted: 21 Jan 2015 Last revised: 22 Jan 2015

Giovanni Luca Ciampaglia

Indiana University Bloomington - School of Informatics and Computing

Sergi Lozano

Universitat Rovira i Virgili

Dirk Helbing

ETH Zürich - Department of Humanities, Social and Political Sciences (GESS)

Date Written: January 19, 2015

Abstract

We study the joint influence of anonymity and power balance on sharing behavior in bargaining interactions. To reach such a goal, we perform an innovative Web experiment based on the Ultimatum Game. The proposed experimental setting ensures strict anonymity conditions, prevents the 'wind-fall effect' and includes three different scenarios of power balance, which were designed to clearly differentiate self- and fairness-oriented preferences. Our results suggest a heterogeneity of players. Some present a behaviour according to selfish preferences, others to fairness-oriented ones, and some to other, to context-based principles like the exercise of 'the power of the last word' to punish unfair proposals. This study raises a number of further questions that need to be addressed in future experiments on bargaining behavior. For example, it is shown that the currently most established behavioral theories may need to be further improved or revised.

Keywords: ultimatum game, web experiments, ultimatum game, anonymity, power balance

Suggested Citation

Ciampaglia, Giovanni Luca and Lozano, Sergi and Helbing, Dirk, Anonymous Sharing Behavior in Web Experiments with Different Balance of Power (January 19, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2552202 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2552202

Giovanni Luca Ciampaglia

Indiana University Bloomington - School of Informatics and Computing ( email )

901 E 10th St
Bloomington, IN 47401
United States

Sergi Lozano

Universitat Rovira i Virgili ( email )

Campus Sescelades, Carretera de Valls s/n
43006 Tarragona, Tarragona 43007
Spain

Dirk Helbing (Contact Author)

ETH Zürich - Department of Humanities, Social and Political Sciences (GESS) ( email )

ETH Zurich - Swiss Federal Institute of Technology
Clausiusstrasse 50
Zurich, 8092
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://www.coss.ethz.ch

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