Economic Coordination within a Mixed Ecology of Enterprises: Erasing a Theoretical Antinomy

32 Pages Posted: 20 Jan 2015

See all articles by Marta Podemska-Mikluch

Marta Podemska-Mikluch

Gustavus Adolphus College

Richard E. Wagner

George Mason University - Department of Economics; George Mason University - Mercatus Center

Date Written: January 19, 2015

Abstract

Economic theory contains a significant theoretical antinomy that we seek to erase. That theory can account for coordination through markets. Such coordination, however, covers only some 50-60 percent of economic activity within developed nations. The theory ignores the remainder by presuming that it is provided somehow through the insertion of collective planning and power. We seek to erase this common theoretical antinomy by locating political action within the transactional framework of market interaction. All economic activity, whether pursued by private or collective entities, occurs within a framework of incomplete and distributed knowledge. A significant precursor to our effort is Maffeo Pantaleoni’s (1911) recognition of the parasitical character of political pricing, where political entities calculate through parasitical attachment to market entities. We use a simple model of coordination within an airport to illustrate our approach to economic coordination among differently constituted enterprises.

Keywords: economic calculation; economic coordination; public-private interaction; parasitical political pricing; entangled political economy

JEL Classification: D23, D73, H44, L32

Suggested Citation

Podemska-Mikluch, Marta and Wagner, Richard E., Economic Coordination within a Mixed Ecology of Enterprises: Erasing a Theoretical Antinomy (January 19, 2015). GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 15-01, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2552320 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2552320

Marta Podemska-Mikluch

Gustavus Adolphus College ( email )

800 West College Ave.
Saint Peter, MN Mn 56082
United States
(507) 933-6120 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.podemska.com

Richard E. Wagner (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
334 Enterprise Hall
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
(703) 993-1132 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://mason.gmu.edu/~rwagner/

George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )

3434 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

HOME PAGE: http://ppe.mercatus.org/scholars/richard-wagner

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