Federal Solution to the EU Internal Sovereignty Conundrum: The European Doctrine of the Czech Constitutional Court and the U.S. Compact Theory

In Tichy, L. and Dumbrovsky, T. (eds) Sovereignty and Competences of the European Union, pp. 80-100. Charles University, Prague 2010

25 Pages Posted: 24 Jan 2015 Last revised: 25 Mar 2015

See all articles by Tomas Dumbrovsky

Tomas Dumbrovsky

Yale Law School; Charles University in Prague - Faculty of Law

Date Written: December 21, 2010

Abstract

In this article, I confront sovereignty based attacks of constitutive units on a central government of two entities lying on federalist foundations – the European Union and the United States. Inquiring into the development of the American Compact Theory on the one hand and into the European doctrine of the Czech Constitutional Court on the other, one may be astonished by the similarities in their reasoning. It has to be borne in mind that the Czech Constitutional Court represents a much broader group of ‘revolting’ national judiciaries. The aim of this article is to come to a normative solution to the sovereignty conundrum, which federalism might offer.

Keywords: constitutional core; Lisbon Treaty; Sugar Quotas; Althusius; Czech Constitutional Court; US Compact Theory; European doctrine; US; EU; sovereignty; federalism

Suggested Citation

Dumbrovsky, Tomas, Federal Solution to the EU Internal Sovereignty Conundrum: The European Doctrine of the Czech Constitutional Court and the U.S. Compact Theory (December 21, 2010). In Tichy, L. and Dumbrovsky, T. (eds) Sovereignty and Competences of the European Union, pp. 80-100. Charles University, Prague 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2553438

Tomas Dumbrovsky (Contact Author)

Yale Law School ( email )

P.O. Box 208215
New Haven, CT 06520-8215
United States

HOME PAGE: http://mwpweb.eu/TomasDumbrovsky/

Charles University in Prague - Faculty of Law ( email )

Nam. Curieovych 7
Praha, 11640
Czech Republic

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