Download This PaperEquilibrium Contracts for the Central Bank of a Monetary Union
18 Pages Posted: 9 Feb 2001
Date Written: December 2000
Abstract
We consider the political economy of a monetary union where member governments attempt to influence the policy of the common central bank. Modeling this as a common agency with incentive contracts, we show that if incentives are all that matters for the bank, the equilibrium implements a weighted average of the countries' most preferred policy. We then argue that making the bank inflation averse and/or attentive towards the countries' economic developments is undesirable in this context.
Keywords: Monetary Union, Incentive Contracts, Common Agency
JEL Classification: E52, E58, F33, F42
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Avinash K. Dixit
Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States
609-258-4000 (Phone)
609-258-6419 (Fax)
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de
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