The Long and the Short of it: Sovereign Debt Crises and Debt Maturity
42 Pages Posted: 23 Jan 2015
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The Long and the Short of it: Sovereign Debt Crises and Debt Maturity
Date Written: December 2014
Abstract
We present a simple model of sovereign debt crises in which a country chooses its optimal mix of short and long-term debt contracts subject to standard contracting frictions: the country cannot commit to repay its debts nor to a specific path of future debt issues, and contracts cannot be made state contingent. We show that in order to satisfy incentive compatibility the country must issue short-term debt, which exposes it to roll-over crises and inefficient repayments. We examine two policies -- restructuring and reprofiling -- and show that both improve ex ante welfare if structured correctly. Key to the welfare results is the country's ability to choose its debt structure so as to neutralize any negative effects resulting from redistribution of payments across creditors in times of crises.
Keywords: dilution, optimal maturity, sovereign debt
JEL Classification: F15, F33, F34, F36, F41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Raquel Fernández (Contact Author)
New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics ( email )
269 Mercer Street
New York, NY 10003
United States
212-998-8908 (Phone)
212-995-4186 (Fax)
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The Long and the Short of it: Sovereign Debt Crises and Debt Maturity
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