Who's Favored by Evaluative Voting ? An Experiment Conducted During the 2012 French Presidential Election

28 Pages Posted: 24 Jan 2015

See all articles by Antoinette Baujard

Antoinette Baujard

University of Lyon 2 - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE)

Frédéric Gavrel

Université de Caen

Herrade Igersheim

University of Strasbourg

Jean‐François Laslier

University of Angers - French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS)

Isabelle Lebon

Université de Caen

Date Written: November 2014

Abstract

Under evaluative voting, the voter freely grades each candidate on a numerical scale, with the winning candidate being determined by the sum of the grades they receive. This paper compares evaluative voting with the two-round system, reporting on an experiment, conducted during the 2012 French presidential election, which attracted 2,340 participants. Here we show that the two-round system favors “exclusive” candidates, that is candidates who elicit strong feelings, while evaluative rules favor “inclusive” candidates, that is candidates who attract the support of a large span of the electorate. These differences are explained by two complementary reasons: the opportunity for the voter to support several candidates under evaluative voting rules, and the specific pattern of strategic voting under the two-round voting rule.

Keywords: Voting, In Situ Experiment, Evaluative Voting, Approval Voting, Two-round system

JEL Classification: D72, C93

Suggested Citation

Baujard, Antoinette and Gavrel, Frédéric and Igersheim, Herrade and Laslier, Jean‐François and Lebon, Isabelle, Who's Favored by Evaluative Voting ? An Experiment Conducted During the 2012 French Presidential Election (November 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2554474 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2554474

Antoinette Baujard (Contact Author)

University of Lyon 2 - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE) ( email )

93 chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France

Frédéric Gavrel

Université de Caen ( email )

F-14032 Caen Cedex, Normandy
France

Herrade Igersheim

University of Strasbourg ( email )

61, avenue de la foret noire
Strasbourg, Alsace 3000
France

Jean‐François Laslier

University of Angers - French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) ( email )

3, rue Michel-Ange
Paris cedex 16, 75794
France

Isabelle Lebon

Université de Caen ( email )

F-14032 Caen Cedex
France

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