Plausible Cooperation

29 Pages Posted: 25 Jan 2015

See all articles by Olivier Compte

Olivier Compte

Paris School of Economics (PSE); Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées (ENPC) - Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique (CERAS)

Andrew Postlewaite

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Date Written: January 23, 2015

Abstract

There is a large repeated games literature illustrating how future interactions provide incentives for cooperation. Much of the earlier literature assumes public monitoring. Departures from public monitoring to private monitoring that incorporate differences in players’ observations may dramatically complicate coordination and the provision of incentives, with the consequence that equilibria with private monitoring often seem unrealistically complex or fragile. We set out a model in which players accomplish cooperation in an intuitively plausible fashion. Players process information via a mental system — a set of psychological states and a transition function between states depending on observations. Players restrict attention to a relatively small set of simple strategies, and consequently, might learn which perform well.

Keywords: repeated games, private monitoring, bounded rationality, cooperation

JEL Classification: D01, D70

Suggested Citation

Compte, Olivier and Postlewaite, Andrew, Plausible Cooperation (January 23, 2015). PIER Working Paper No. 15-006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2554521 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2554521

Olivier Compte

Paris School of Economics (PSE)

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France

Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées (ENPC) - Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique (CERAS) ( email )

28, rue des Saints-Peres
75007 Paris
France

Andrew Postlewaite (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-7350 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/~apostlew

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