Why So Much Stability?: Majority Voting, Legislative Institutions, and Gordon Tullock
30 Pages Posted: 25 Jan 2015
Date Written: 2012
Gordon Tullock, nearly a half century ago, raised questions about Arrow’s Theorem (“a phantom has stalked the classrooms and seminars of economics and political science”). He followed this up by asking, in light of Arrow’s Theorem, “Why so much stability?” In this paper a more nuanced understanding of the operating characteristics of majority rule in institutional settings, anticipated and stimulated by Tullock, is spelled out. A major distinction is made between preference cycles and voting cycles, suggesting why Arrow’s phantom still stalks, but that Tullock’s intuitions are germane as well.
Keywords: voting cycles, preference cycles, majority rule, equilibrium, legislative choice
JEL Classification: H11, N40, P16
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation