Regional Contribution Agreements: Compensation for Exclusionary Zoning

60 Temp. L.Q. 665 (1987)

33 Pages Posted: 12 Feb 2015

Date Written: 1987

Abstract

The article examines regional contribution agreements, a cost-benefit approach to affordable housing, by which municipalities trade their responsibilities in market-like transactions allowing those most willing to accommodate such housing being compensated by those who cannot. The article cautions that such “free market” privatization of the allocation of responsibility for affordable housing could backfire, resulting in urban areas being compensated to keep the poor exactly where they are, and in a worst case scenario, accelerating gentrification, pushing marginalized home-seekers completely out of the metropolitan area.

Keywords: Zoning and planning, Tiebout hypothesis, exclusionary zoning, regional contribution agreements, affordable hosing

Suggested Citation

McDougall, Harold A., Regional Contribution Agreements: Compensation for Exclusionary Zoning (1987). 60 Temp. L.Q. 665 (1987). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2554829

Harold A. McDougall (Contact Author)

Howard University School of Law ( email )

2900 Van Ness Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20008
United States

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