The Impact of Judicial Efficiency on Entrepreneurial Action: A European Perspective

18 Pages Posted: 25 Jan 2015

See all articles by Roberto Ippoliti

Roberto Ippoliti

Italian National School of Administration

Alessandro Melcarne

Université Paris Ouest - Nanterre, La Défense

Giovanni Battista Ramello

University of Piemonte Orientale - A. Avogadro - Department of Public Policy and Public Choice; International Centre for Economic Research (ICER)

Date Written: February 2015

Abstract

This paper is aimed at assessing the role of the judicial system in facilitating entrepreneurial action. More precisely it tries to show how the quality in solving dispute affects the would‐be entrepreneurs' perception on the reliability in enforcing contract and the easiness in accessing credit. The estimates confirm the aforementioned theoretical premises on an empirical ground. Judicial efficiency is a relevant factor for explaining entrepreneurship also when accounting for a set of various country‐specific characteristics regarding not only the judiciary, but also the law on the books, the political environment, and socio‐economic conditions.

Suggested Citation

Ippoliti, Roberto and Melcarne, Alessandro and Ramello, Giovanni Battista, The Impact of Judicial Efficiency on Entrepreneurial Action: A European Perspective (February 2015). Economic Notes, Vol. 44, Issue 1, pp. 57-74, 2015. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2555081 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecno.12030

Roberto Ippoliti (Contact Author)

Italian National School of Administration

Italy

Alessandro Melcarne

Université Paris Ouest - Nanterre, La Défense

200 Avenue de la République
Nanterre, Hauts de Seine 92000
France

Giovanni Battista Ramello

University of Piemonte Orientale - A. Avogadro - Department of Public Policy and Public Choice ( email )

Via Cavour 84
15100 Alessandria
Italy

International Centre for Economic Research (ICER) ( email )

Villa Gualino
Viale Settimio Severo, 63
10133 Torino
Italy

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