A Job Is Not a Hobby: The Judicial Revival of Corporate Paternalism and Its Problematic Implications

Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 41, P. 71, 2015

U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 15-2

76 Pages Posted: 28 Jan 2015 Last revised: 8 Apr 2016

See all articles by Leo E. Strine, Jr.

Leo E. Strine, Jr.

Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz; University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School; Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance

Date Written: 2015

Abstract

This article connects the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby to the history of “corporate paternalism.” It details the history of employer efforts to restrict the freedom of employees, and legislative attempts to ensure worker freedom. It also highlights the role of employment in healthcare coverage, and situates the Affordable Care Act’s “minimum essential guarantees” in a historical and global context. The article also discusses how Hobby Lobby combines with the Supreme Court’s earlier decisions in Citizens United and National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius to constrain the government’s ability to extend the social safety net, and shows how those decisions put pressure on corporate law itself.

Note: The article was the subject of lectures to the Securities Regulation Institute of Northwestern University School of Law and the American Constitution Society Student Chapter at Harvard Law School.

Keywords: Hobby Lobby; corporate law; corporate paternalism

Suggested Citation

Strine, Jr., Leo E., A Job Is Not a Hobby: The Judicial Revival of Corporate Paternalism and Its Problematic Implications (2015). Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 41, P. 71, 2015, U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 15-2, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2555816 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2555816

Leo E. Strine, Jr. (Contact Author)

Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz ( email )

51 W 52nd St
New York, NY 10019
United States
212-403-1178 (Phone)

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School ( email )

Philadelphia, PA
United States

Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance ( email )

1563 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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