International environmental agreements with support

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 15-015/VIII

25 Pages Posted: 27 Jan 2015 Last revised: 8 Jul 2017

See all articles by Erik Ansink

Erik Ansink

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Spatial Economics

Hans-Peter Weikard

Wageningen UR - School of Social Sciences

Cees Withagen

Free University of Amsterdam; Tilburg University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 1, 2017

Abstract

We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of international environmental agreements, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without becoming coalition members themselves. We assume their support takes the form of a monetary transfer to the coalition, in order to induce larger coalitions, higher levels of public good provision and higher payoffs. We show that, under mild conditions on the costs and benefits of contributing to the public good (e.g. abatement of greenhouse gas emissions), there exist equilibria with support. Allowing for support increases payoffs to each of three types of agents: members, supporters and free-riders.

Keywords: Coalition formation; Public goods; Support; Transfers; International Environmental Agreements

JEL Classification: C72, D02, H41, Q54

Suggested Citation

Ansink, Erik and Weikard, Hans-Peter and Withagen, Cees A. M., International environmental agreements with support (July 1, 2017). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 15-015/VIII. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2556048 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2556048

Erik Ansink (Contact Author)

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Spatial Economics ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
1081HV Amsterdam
Netherlands

Hans-Peter Weikard

Wageningen UR - School of Social Sciences ( email )

De Leeuwenborch
Hollandseweg 1
6706 KN Wageningen
Netherlands
+31 317 48 24 94 (Phone)
+31 317 48 49 33 (Fax)

Cees A. M. Withagen

Free University of Amsterdam ( email )

Tinbergen Institute De Boelelaan 1105
1081 HV Amsterdam
Netherlands

Tilburg University ( email )

Postbus 90153
Tilburg, DC Noord-Brabant 5000 LE
Netherlands

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