Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2556669
 


 



Consider This: Training, Wages, and the Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete


Evan P Starr


University of Maryland Robert H Smith School of Business

September 28, 2016


Abstract:     
This study examines the effect of noncompete enforceability on training and wages. An increase from non-enforcement to mean enforceability is associated with an 11% increase in firm-sponsored training, no effect on self-sponsored training, and a 1.7% decrease in average wages. The small, negative wage effect averages together contrasting positive effects for low earners but negative effects for high earners. One noncompete policy that does not reduce training but is associated with higher wages throughout the distribution is the requirement that firms provide workers with consideration beyond continued employment in exchange for signing noncompetes.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 45

Keywords: Firm-Sponsored Training, Wages, Mobility, Covenants Not to Compete

JEL Classification: J3, J4, J6, K3, L41, M53


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Date posted: January 29, 2015 ; Last revised: September 28, 2016

Suggested Citation

Starr, Evan P, Consider This: Training, Wages, and the Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete (September 28, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2556669 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2556669

Contact Information

Evan P Starr (Contact Author)
University of Maryland Robert H Smith School of Business ( email )
United States
(301) 405-2320 (Phone)
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