Why Was the Enforcement Pyramid so Influential? And What Price Was Paid?

Regulation & Governance, 7:48–60 (2013) doi:10.1111/rego.12003

27 Pages Posted: 29 Jan 2015

See all articles by Peter Mascini

Peter Mascini

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law; Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Faculty of Social Sciences

Date Written: December 28, 2013

Abstract

Although responsive regulation includes much more than the enforcement pyramid, it is the pyramid that has received most attention from academics and practitioners. This is despite the fact that the implementation of the strategy of gradual escalation has proved challenging in many respects. Why has the enforcement pyramid been so attractive? Apart from its scholarly and policy usefulness, this paper suggests it appeals to practitioners because it provides a theoretical endorsement of the professional autonomy to which practitioners aspire. It was and is still appealing to scholars because it provides a practical means to improve regulation which is congruent with the dominant neoliberal reflex to depoliticize the regulation of capitalist economies. All in all, because responsive regulation has very largely been reduced to the enforcement pyramid, the literature has neglected the normative issues surrounding the regulation of capitalist economies that were central to Ayres and Braithwaite.

Keywords: civic republicanism, enforcement pyramid, persuasion, punishment, responsive

JEL Classification: K20, K32

Suggested Citation

Mascini, Peter, Why Was the Enforcement Pyramid so Influential? And What Price Was Paid? (December 28, 2013). Regulation & Governance, 7:48–60 (2013) doi:10.1111/rego.12003, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2556706

Peter Mascini (Contact Author)

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