Human Dignity and the Foundations of Human Rights

Abstract

This chapter investigates whether human rights are grounded in human dignity. Starting from an interest-based account of human rights, it rejects two objections to that account that have been pressed in the name of human dignity: the deontological and the personhood objections. More positively, it contends that human dignity is the equal moral status possessed by all human beings simply in virtue of their possession of a human nature, and that so understood, it has an essential role to play in grounding human rights, but that it can only play this role in tandem with universal human interests. In particular, human dignity is central to explaining both why humans can possess rights and why these rights are resistant to trade-offs. The chapter concludes with some reflections on the implications of this view for whether each and every human being possesses all of the standard human rights.

Keywords: Human rights, human dignity, human nature, deontology, personhood, interests