Territorial States: Monopolies in the Market for Justice

56 Pages Posted: 1 Feb 2015  

Ellis Goldberg

University of Washington

Date Written: January 30, 2015

Abstract

The medieval Muslim state system did not resemble that which developed in Europe. Many reasons for this have been asserted. One which has never been discussed is that the commercial and merchant classes developed alternative, exit-based, strategies to secure property rights. In such a system, first analyzed by Charles Tiebout, the development of voice-based institutions is not an efficient use of resources. Over the long run exit can be an effective strategy to bargain with monarchs over property rights as long as a trans-regional system of law, such as Islamic shariah, exists. Such a system may also reinforce a tendency to invest in mobile rather than fixed capital.

Keywords: Political Economy, International Relations, State-building, Comparative Politics, Exit, Islam

Suggested Citation

Goldberg, Ellis, Territorial States: Monopolies in the Market for Justice (January 30, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2558288 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2558288

Ellis Goldberg (Contact Author)

University of Washington ( email )

Seattle, WA 98195
United States

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