Deferred Corporate Prosecution as Corrupt Regime: The Case for Prison

31 Pages Posted: 2 Feb 2015

See all articles by Ezra Wasserman Mitchell

Ezra Wasserman Mitchell

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics - School of Law

Date Written: February 1, 2015

Abstract

This paper looks at the growing phenomenon of deferred corporate criminal prosecutions from a new perspective. The literature accepts the practice and is largely concerned with the degree to which efficient and effective criminal deterrence is achieved through pretrial diversion. I examine the practice and conclude that it presents, from a structural perspective, a case of a corrupt law enforcement regime centered in the United States Department of Justice. The regime works in effective – if unintentional – conspiracy with corporate officials to produce an inefficient enforcement regime that disregards democratic processes and threatens a loss of respect for the rule of law. I conclude that the use of individual prosecution with the possibility of prison for corporate executives is the most effective way to restore the corporate criminal regime to a functioning legal practice.

Keywords: deferred prosecution, corruption, corporate, criminal

Suggested Citation

Wasserman Mitchell, Ezra, Deferred Corporate Prosecution as Corrupt Regime: The Case for Prison (February 1, 2015). Case Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2015-06. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2558748 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2558748

Ezra Wasserman Mitchell (Contact Author)

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics - School of Law ( email )

777 Guoding Road
Shanghai, 200433
China

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