Are Fines Fine? Sanctioning Infringements of the Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices in Hungary

Unfair Commercial Practices The long road to harmonized law enforcement edited by Tihamer Toth Pazmany Press Budapest, 2014

15 Pages Posted: 4 Feb 2015

See all articles by Tihamer Toth

Tihamer Toth

Peter Pazmany Catholic University - Faculty of Law; Competition Law Research Centre, Hungary

Date Written: November 2, 2013

Abstract

This paper gives an overview about the legal background and the practice of the Hungarian Competition Authority as regards imposing monetary sanctions for misleading advertising and other types of unfair commercial practices. The sometimes unpredictable fluctuation of the level of fines is criticized. It is emphasized that the clear meaning of broadly worded legal prohibitions is essential before sanctions with the aim of deterrence are imposed. Consequently, in some cases where the infringement was not obvious, a less strict approach is advised, whereas for repeat infringers harming a wide range of consumers, personal, in some cases even criminal law liability should be the optimal sanction.

Keywords: unfair commercial practices, misleading advertisement, fines, monetary sanctions, criminal sanctions, repeat infringement, Hungarian Competition Authority, UCP Directive

JEL Classification: K20, K40

Suggested Citation

Toth, Tihamer, Are Fines Fine? Sanctioning Infringements of the Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices in Hungary (November 2, 2013). Unfair Commercial Practices The long road to harmonized law enforcement edited by Tihamer Toth Pazmany Press Budapest, 2014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2559206 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2559206

Tihamer Toth (Contact Author)

Peter Pazmany Catholic University - Faculty of Law ( email )

Budapest
Hungary

Competition Law Research Centre, Hungary ( email )

PPKE-JAK
Szentkiralyi u. 28.
Budapest, H-1088
Hungary

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