De Jure Determinants of New Firm Formation: How the Pillars of Constitutions Influence Entrepreneurship

Quaderni - Working Paper DSE N° 991

35 Pages Posted: 4 Feb 2015

See all articles by Emanuela Carbonara

Emanuela Carbonara

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Enrico Santarelli

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Date Written: February 2, 2015

Abstract

This paper provides empirical evidence supporting the view that constitutions may influence the organization of economic activities. Dealing with the issue of the institutional determinants of entrepreneurship, it shows that some of the provisions contained in national constitutions are positively and significantly associated to a standard measure of entrepreneurial dynamics, namely the rate of new business density. Using a novel dataset containing the characteristics of the constitutions enacted in the world and a sample of 115 countries, the paper finds that provisions about the right to conduct/establish a business, the right to strike, consumer protection, protection of trademarks, and education promote higher rates of new firm formation.

Keywords: Constitutional Rules, Entrepreneurship, New Firm Formation, Economic Effects of Constitutions

JEL Classification: D72, K10, H10, L26, M13, O50, P48

Suggested Citation

Carbonara, Emanuela and Santarelli, Enrico, De Jure Determinants of New Firm Formation: How the Pillars of Constitutions Influence Entrepreneurship (February 2, 2015). Quaderni - Working Paper DSE N° 991. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2559675 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2559675

Emanuela Carbonara (Contact Author)

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 2
Bologna, 40126
Italy
+39 051 2098149 (Phone)
+39 051 2098040 (Fax)

Enrico Santarelli

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli, 2
I-40126 Bologna
Italy
+39 051 2098487 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www2.dse.unibo.it/santarel

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