How Institutions Shape Land Deals: The Role of Corruption

17 Pages Posted: 4 Feb 2015

See all articles by Matthias Bujko

Matthias Bujko

University of Freiburg - Department of Economics

Christian Fischer

University of Freiburg - Department of Economics

Tim Krieger

University of Freiburg - Department of Economics

Daniel Meierrieks

WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 30, 2015

Abstract

Large-scale land acquisitions often take place in developing countries which are also known for their corruption-friendliness caused by weak institutional frameworks. We hypothesize that corruption indeed leads to more land deals. We argue that corrupt elites exploit poor institutional setups (characterized by corruption) to strike deals with domestic and international investors at the expense of the local population. Using panel data for 156 countries from 2000-2011, we provide evidence that large-scale land deals indeed occur more often in countries with higher levels of corruption. The estimated effects are also economically substantive and particularly relevant to economies with unsound institutions.

Keywords: large-scale land acquisitions, land grabbing, foreign investments, weak institutions, corruption

JEL Classification: F210, O130, Q150

Suggested Citation

Bujko, Matthias and Fischer, Christian and Krieger, Tim and Meierrieks, Daniel, How Institutions Shape Land Deals: The Role of Corruption (January 30, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2559718 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2559718

Matthias Bujko (Contact Author)

University of Freiburg - Department of Economics ( email )

Freiburg, D-79085
Germany

Christian Fischer

University of Freiburg - Department of Economics ( email )

Freiburg, D-79085
Germany

Tim Krieger

University of Freiburg - Department of Economics ( email )

University of Freiburg
Wilhelmstr. 1b
Freiburg, D-79085
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.wguth.uni-freiburg.de

Daniel Meierrieks

WZB Berlin Social Science Center ( email )

Reichpietschufer
50
Berlin, D-10785
Germany

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