Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2559755
 


 



Competition for Antitrust: The National Civic Federation and the Founding of the FTC


Peter J. Boettke


George Mason University - Department of Economics

Thomas K. Duncan


Radford University - Department of Economics

Nicholas A. Snow


Wabash College - Economics

February 3, 2015

GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 15-16

Abstract:     
Regulation by the state can benefit or harm any business in society. While the market provides for consumers rather than special interests, rationally acting interests will be incentivized to use political means to capture rents, particularly if public clamor for regulation exists. The formation of the Federal Trade Commission, rather than providing a check on business interests, follows the pattern of regulatory capture. The National Civic Federation, a group with strong business interest ties, was crucial to ensuring this outcome at the commission’s founding.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 22

Keywords: Regulatory Capture, National Civic Federation, Federal Trade Commission, Regulation, Interventionism

JEL Classification: G38, N41, N42, P16


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Date posted: February 4, 2015 ; Last revised: March 7, 2015

Suggested Citation

Boettke, Peter J. and Duncan, Thomas K. and Snow, Nicholas A., Competition for Antitrust: The National Civic Federation and the Founding of the FTC (February 3, 2015). GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 15-16. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2559755 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2559755

Contact Information

Peter J. Boettke
George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )
4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
703-993-1149 (Phone)
703-993-1133 (Fax)
Thomas K. Duncan (Contact Author)
Radford University - Department of Economics ( email )
P.O. Box 6952
Radford, VA 24142
United States
Nicholas A. Snow
Wabash College - Economics ( email )
P.O. Box 352
Crawfordsville, IN 47933-0352
United States
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