Open Versus Closed Conference Calls: The Determinants and Effects of Broadening Access to Disclosure

Bushee, Brian J.; Matsumoto, Dawn A.; Miller, Gregory S.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.255996

Open Versus Closed Conference Calls: The Determinants and Effects of Broadening Access to Disclosure

JAE Boston Conference June 2001

46 Pages Posted: 11 Jan 2001

See all articles by Brian J. Bushee

Brian J. Bushee

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School

Dawn A. Matsumoto

University of Washington - Department of Accounting

Gregory S. Miller

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business

There are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2002

Abstract

Recent advances in information technology allow firms to provide broader access to their disclosures. We examine the determinants and effects of the decision to provide unlimited real-time access to conference calls (i.e., "open"conference calls). Our evidence suggests that the decision to provide open calls is associated with the composition of a firm's investor base and, to some degree, the complexity of its financial information. We also find that open calls are associated with a greater increase in small trades (consistent with individuals trading on information released during the call) and higher price volatility during the call period.

Key Words: Conference calls, corporate disclosure, selective disclosure, price volatility, institutional investors

JEL Classification: M41, M44, G12, G14, G29, G39, K22

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Bushee, Brian J. and Matsumoto, Dawn and Miller, Gregory S., Open Versus Closed Conference Calls: The Determinants and Effects of Broadening Access to Disclosure (February 2002). JAE Boston Conference June 2001. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=255996 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.255996