Seller Beware: Supply and Demand Reduction and Price Manipulation in Multiple-Unit Uniform Price Auctions

93 Pages Posted: 21 Feb 2015

See all articles by Abel Winn

Abel Winn

Chapman University - The George L. Argyros School of Business & Economics

Michael Parente

University of Southern California

David Porter

Chapman University - The George L. Argyros School of Business & Economics

Date Written: February 20, 2015

Abstract

We experimentally compare under-revelation of supply and demand across alternative variations of ascending and descending two-sided price clock auctions. We find that buyers reduce demand more when the price is ascending but sellers’ behavior is consistent across clock directions. As a result, the clock price rule has empirical effects on efficiency even though it is theoretically neutral.

Keywords: Demand Reduction, Supply Reduction, Uniform Price Auctions, Clock Auctions

JEL Classification: D02, D44

Suggested Citation

Winn, Abel and Parente, Michael and Porter, David, Seller Beware: Supply and Demand Reduction and Price Manipulation in Multiple-Unit Uniform Price Auctions (February 20, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2560064 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2560064

Abel Winn (Contact Author)

Chapman University - The George L. Argyros School of Business & Economics ( email )

333 N. Glassell
Orange, CA 92866
United States

Michael Parente

University of Southern California ( email )

2250 Alcazar Street
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

David Porter

Chapman University - The George L. Argyros School of Business & Economics ( email )

Orange, CA
United States
(714) 997-6915 (Phone)
(714) 628-2881 (Fax)

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
27
Abstract Views
290
PlumX Metrics