Alliances in the Shadow of Conflict

18 Pages Posted: 7 Feb 2015

See all articles by Changxia Ke

Changxia Ke

Lingnan (University) College, Sun Yat-sen University

Kai A. Konrad

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Florian Morath

Department of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck; Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2015

Abstract

Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. This article presents an experiment on the determinants of whether alliances break up and fight internally after having defeated a joint enemy. First, if peaceful sharing yields an asymmetric rent distribution, this increases the likelihood of fighting. In turn, anticipation of the higher likelihood of internal fight reduces the alliance’s ability to succeed against the outside enemy. Second, the option to make nonbinding nonaggression declarations between alliance members does not make peaceful settlement within the alliance more likely. Third, higher differences in the alliance players’ contributions to alliance effort lead to more internal conflict and more intense fighting.

JEL Classification: D72, D74

Suggested Citation

Ke, Changxia and Konrad, Kai A. and Morath, Florian, Alliances in the Shadow of Conflict (April 2015). Economic Inquiry, Vol. 53, Issue 2, pp. 854-871, 2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2561659 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12151

Changxia Ke (Contact Author)

Lingnan (University) College, Sun Yat-sen University ( email )

135 Xingang Xi Road
Guangzhou, Guangdong 510275
China

Kai A. Konrad

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/pub/home.cfm

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

90-98 Goswell Road
London, EC1V 7RR
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 81679
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, 53072
Germany

Florian Morath

Department of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck ( email )

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
0
Abstract Views
245
PlumX Metrics