Tax Commitment Devices

39 Pages Posted: 9 Feb 2015 Last revised: 6 Nov 2018

See all articles by Jonathan Choi

Jonathan Choi

NYU School of Law; Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz; Yale Law School

Date Written: February 8, 2015

Abstract

Every line of the Internal Revenue Code is continually vulnerable to revision or repeal. With each new session of Congress, rates may rise or fall, transactions may become taxable or tax-free, and incentive programs may be extended or repealed. The resulting uncertainty harms taxpayers, who find it difficult to plan their future business affairs. It frustrates government by making its incentive programs less effective. For example, firms may decline to invest in research facilities because they cannot rely on a tax credit that might soon expire. And it provides fodder for political rent-seeking, as legislators can demand money or votes in exchange for supporting a soon-to-expire tax break. This was recently seen in the furor over bonus depreciation, a purportedly temporary provision that has been the subject of furious lobbying and frequent renewal.

This paper proposes commitment devices as an antidote to tax uncertainty. I analyze the economic and democratic costs of tax uncertainty, and why even a perfectly altruistic and rational legislature might benefit from credible policy commitment. I also describe the most practicable tax commitment devices within the bounds of current law, and I consider how those devices can improve current provisions for bonus depreciation and the R&D credit.

Keywords: Tax, Taxation, Legislation, Commitment Devices

JEL Classification: K34

Suggested Citation

Choi, Jonathan, Tax Commitment Devices (February 8, 2015). 15 Journal of Business & Securities Law 1 (2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2562052

Jonathan Choi (Contact Author)

NYU School of Law ( email )

Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz ( email )

51 West 52nd Street
New York, NY 10019
United States

Yale Law School ( email )

New Haven, CT 06520
United States

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