Slicing Spontaneity

24 Pages Posted: 9 Feb 2015 Last revised: 15 Aug 2015

See all articles by Lee Anne Fennell

Lee Anne Fennell

University of Chicago - Law School

Date Written: February 9, 2015

Abstract

In this symposium essay, I consider the role of resource segmentation — the natural or artificial division of resources into appropriable or contributable units — in eliciting and maintaining coordination in the absence of formal private property rights or top-down coercion. I argue that the appropriate segmentation of resources can reduce informal governance burdens and, by constructing choice sets, promote convergence between privately optimal and socially optimal choices. The effects on governance follow from the fact that segmentation, whether given by nature (fish, trees, pieces of fruit) or artificially constructed (boatloads, bushels, pie slices) provides a measuring rod for assessing draws on, or contributions to, common pools. In addition, when contributions to or withdrawals from a common pool take a chunky, discontinuous form, the private and social optimum may more readily converge on a single choice, despite the presence of externalities. This lumpiness in choices influences when externalities will be relevant to efficiency and can amplify the significance of policies and norms that edge decisions in socially desirable directions. Resource segmentation should, therefore, receive independent attention as a design element important to sustaining spontaneous order.

Keywords: common-pool resources, coordination, spontaneous order, governance, lumpiness, irrelevant externalities

Suggested Citation

Fennell, Lee Anne, Slicing Spontaneity (February 9, 2015). 100 Iowa Law Review 2365 (2015); University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 717; U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 509. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2562193

Lee Anne Fennell (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Law School ( email )

1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-0603 (Phone)

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