Political Dimensions of Investment Arbitration: ISDS and the TTIP Negotiations

29 Pages Posted: 11 Feb 2015

See all articles by Thomas Dietz

Thomas Dietz

University of Münster - Institute of Political Science (IFPOL)

Marius Dotzauer

University of Münster - Institute of Political Science (IFPOL)

Date Written: February 10, 2015

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to explore the political dimensions of investment arbitration. What drives the structures and rules of this institution of private-transnational dispute settlement? To define political dimensions and develop the basis of a political explanation of investment arbitration, we reconstruct the conflict about investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in the negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). We argue that the competing interests of different actors shape the design of the institution. Investment arbitration has become politicized. On a horizontal dimension, interest groups argue about the risks and benefits of arbitration. On a vertical dimension, government authorities struggle to balance national sovereignty and global interests. We indicate a political process, defined by the configuration of the horizontal and the vertical dimension, which drives the emergence and development of investment arbitration.

Keywords: Arbitration, investor-state dispute settlement, TTIP, politicization, distributional conflicts

JEL Classification: F13, F15, F21, K33, P16

Suggested Citation

Dietz, Thomas and Dotzauer, Marius, Political Dimensions of Investment Arbitration: ISDS and the TTIP Negotiations (February 10, 2015). ZenTra Working Paper in Transnational Studies No. 48 / 2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2562916 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2562916

Thomas Dietz (Contact Author)

University of Münster - Institute of Political Science (IFPOL) ( email )

Scharnhorststraße 100
Münster, 48149

Marius Dotzauer

University of Münster - Institute of Political Science (IFPOL) ( email )

Scharnhorststraße 100
Münster, 48149

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