Get Rid of Unanimity: The Superiority of Majority Rule with Veto Power

55 Pages Posted: 10 Feb 2015

See all articles by Laurent Bouton

Laurent Bouton

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB)

Aniol Llorente-Saguer

Queen Mary University of London

Frederic Malherbe

University College London - Department of Economics

Date Written: February 2015

Abstract

Consider a group of agents whose goal is to reform the status quo if and only if this is Pareto improving. Agents have private information and may have common or private objectives, which creates a tension between information aggregation and minority protection. We propose a simple voting system - majority rule with veto power - that essentially resolves this tension, for it combines the advantageous properties of both majority and unanimity rules. We argue that our results shed new light on the evolution of voting rules in EU institutions and could guide policy reforms in cases such as juries in the US.

Keywords: constructive abstention, information aggregation, Pareto criterion, unanimity rule, veto power

JEL Classification: D70

Suggested Citation

Bouton, Laurent and Llorente-Saguer, Aniol and Malherbe, Frederic, Get Rid of Unanimity: The Superiority of Majority Rule with Veto Power (February 2015). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10408, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2562973

Laurent Bouton (Contact Author)

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) ( email )

CP 132 Av FD Roosevelt 50
Brussels, Brussels 1050
Belgium

Aniol Llorente-Saguer

Queen Mary University of London ( email )

Lincoln's Inn Fields
Mile End Rd.
London, E1 4NS
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/aniollls/

Frederic Malherbe

University College London - Department of Economics ( email )

Drayton House, 30 Gordon Street
30 Gordon Street
London, WC1H 0AX
United Kingdom

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